Introduction
Many companies world-wide are continuously looking to improve supply chain efficiencies. A major way of obtaining these efficiencies is through the use of e-marketplaces. Despite slower economic growth in the first two quarters of 2001, it is expected that emarketplaces will provide tremendous value and efficiency to supply chain operations. An e-marketplace is a many-temany market mechanism which allows an enterprise to be connected to its own group of business partners using its application and network infrastructure to optimize various business processes. Marketplaces provide high performance and tight integration with business partners. Procurement (direct and indirect) is an extremely important business process that can benefit from e-marketplaces. Private Marketplaces are now emerging as the preferred platforms for e-procurement. In this case, the buyers are all from the same company which owns the private marketplace. Individual buyers are possibly from different divisions of the same company. The sellers are the preferred suppliers for this company.
The concept of bundhng has the potential of improving the efficiency of the procurement process. Here, related items are bundled into a set of items and the vendors are allowed to bid for the entire set or a subset of the items. This can result in exploitation of complementarity of products and in achieving logistics and lead time efficiencies. The allocation problem (the problem of selecting which vendors will supply which bundles), however, becomes hard, in fact NP-hard.
In this paper, we look into the following procurement problem. There is a buyer who needs to procure a bundle of items, say {Al,. . . , An}. There is a set of sellers who can supply subsets of this bundle. The buyer engages the sellers in an iterative bundle auction with the objective of minimizing his cost of procuring the bundle of items.
We solve this problem by first formulating the problem as a linear integer programming problem that is NP-hard. We then formulate a relaxed version of this problem and show its connection to the iBundle a l g e rithm of David Parkes 1 1 1 . This leadcto what we call as the iterative bundle procurement auction (IBPA). We observe that the use of Parkes' algorithm has inherent computational complexities in solving IBPA. We then propose the use of reinforcement learning techniques in reducing the computational complexity of solving IBPA.
Review
Auctions allow selling goods and apply in situations where a more conventional market in which buyers consider the price as given, does not exist. When an Auction of multiple items is performed, it is often desirable to allow bids on combination of items, as opposed to only on single items. Such an auction is called Combinatorial, and the exponential number of possible combinations results in computational intractability of many aspects regarding such an auction. In particular, the auctioneer's winner-determination (WD) problem, that is choosing bids to optimize the cost or revenue is NP-hard. In iBundle [l] the auctioneer solves a sequence of WD problems to maintain a provisional allocation, which are small in size. At the end of the auction the provisional allocation will be the permanent allocation. iBundle algorithm is a variant of traditional primal-dual algorithm to solve the linear programme formulation of Bickchandani and Ostroy's package assignment model [2] .
More recently, electronic commerce has generated new interest in investigating how adoptive software agents may utilize reinforcement learning algorithms such as Q-learning to make economic decisions such as setting prices in a competitive market place. Price control in a Dutch auction [6] , pricebots and shopbots [SI are some examples. In this paper we use reinforcement learning technique to iBundle algorithm for choosing minimum bid increment to reduce the number of auction rounds to be conducted and economy loss.
An Overview of Reinforcement

Reinforcement Learning
Learning
The term reinforcement learning (RL) originates in studies of learning behavior of animals. Mathematically, it falls somewhere between the supervised and unsupervised learning para,digms of pattern recognition. RL neither calls for exact information about error from the environment, nor works with no information from t.he environment. RL expects a "reinforcement signal" from the environment indicating whether or not the latest move is in the right direction. RL procedures have been eshblished as pori-erful and practical methods for solving Markovian Decision Problems (RIDP).
MDP
Consider a process, observed at time epochs t = 0, 1, ..., to be in one of the states i E S. After observing the state of the process an action a E A = {a', a ' , . . . , a m } is taken, where A is the set of all possible actions. If the process is in state i at time n and action a is chosen, then two things occur, (1) we incur a cost/reward R(i,a) (2) the next state of the system is chosen according to the transition probabilities P;j(a). If we let X, denote the process at time n and a, the action chosen at that time, then assumption (2) can be stated as:
We suppose that we always work with the case where To determine policies that are in some sense optimal, we consider the infinite horizon discounted return as our optimal criterion. This criterion assumes a discount factor a, 0 < a < 1, and among all policies T , attempts to maximize V" where
The function V" : X + R is called the value function for policy T. The use of a discount factor is economically motivated by the fact that the value of money earned tomorrow is worth discounted amount today. The optimal value of the value function, is:
An important equation that V' satisfies is Bellman's optimality equation [?] :
The fact that V' satisfies Bellman's equation can be explained as follows. In the above equation the term in square brackets on the right hand side is the total reward that one would get if action a is chosen at the first time step and then the system performs optimally in all future time steps. Clearly, this term cannot exceed V * ( i ) since that would violate the definition of V', thus V' satisfies the Bellman's equation. it is also known that Bellman's equation has a unique solution [?I. Now the optimal decision problem turns out to be finding V'.
DP Techniques iteration and policy iteration.
Value iteration: This starts with an initial guess VO for the optimal V' and recursively iterates as per Two standard approaches to compute V' are value for n > 0. Using Banach contraction mapping theorem, it is easy to show that V, -i V at an exponential rate. Policy iteration: This starts with initial stationary (randomized) policy no : S + A , for an optimal policy, it does iteratively for n 2 0 as follows:
Step 1: Given nn(.), find V, :
Step 2 : Find
Convergence issues: In value iteration, we solve the nonlinear system of equations ( 5 ) . Define the nonlinear value iteration operator, B, in vector-form as
Component wise, B can be written as follows:
Therefore, the value iteration algorithm can be proven to converge to V' by using Banach contraction mapping theorem, and V, -i V at an exponential rate.
In policy iteration, we evaluate a fixed stationary policy s, which requires solving a linear system of equations (6) . Here also, we can define operator B" as
For a < 1, the operator B" is a contraction operator be- [?I, which are stochastic approximation counterparts of value iteration and policy iteration, respectively. These algorithms are used when the transition probabilities Pij(a) are not explicitly available but a transition with a prescribed probability can be simulated. We now discuss the intuition behind appropriate simulation-based versions of the above two algorithms, for more insights one can refer [?I. The first, of course, is that P*j(a) is replaced by a simulated transition as per the prescribed probabilities Pij(a). In order for this to work, the algorithms should do some averaging. This is ensured by using an incremental version which makes only a small change in current iterates at each step, weighted by a stochastic approximation-like decreasing step size. Qlearning is a simulation-based version of the value iteration, where one works not with value function V, but the Q-value defined by where m is being updated for each &ed n, the value V,
(which is V z -t V,) is then passed to stepefor updating the policy. The crux of the algorithm proposed in [?I is t o achieve this two-tier structure by using two different time scales is as follows. We operate with stationary randomized policies rather than stationary policies. Let {a(.)}, { b ( n ) } be decreasing sequences in (0,l) sat- 
Evaluating the value function for a particular policy is considered as criticism and updating the present policy is considered a s action, that is why it is called as actorcritic algorithm, refer [?] for convergence issues of the actor-critic algorithm.
Procuring items by conducting reverse auction
Auctions are popular, distributed and autonomy preserving ways of allocating items among multiple bidders (sellers). .4uctioneer (buyer) who wants to procure a lot of items conducts the auction, bidders can bid on combinations of items in the lot to be procured by the auctioneer. Determining the set of winning bids to minimize the total procurement cost is a combinatorial optimization problem, which is NP-hard. iBundle, is an iterative combinatorial auction algorithm proposed by Parkesjl]. In this paper, we design an iBundle-type of auction for procurement (which we call IBPA) and show how using reinforcement learning, one can solve IBPA efficiently.
Modeling the procurement (reverse)
Let G denote the set of items to be procured by conducting auction, and I denote the set of bidders, and S C_ G denote the bundle of items. The auction proceeds in rounds, indexed t > Where variable 2,s = 1 if bidder i is allocated bundle S, and zis = 0 otherwise Constraints 1 meant for each bidder receives at most one bundle, constraints 2 meant for each item will he procured from a t most one bidder. Objective function ensures we get every bundle from the bidder who has low private valuation than the other bidders.
Bikchandani and Ostroy[Z] formulate the comhinatcrial resource allocation problem as a linear program. Auct,ioneer (buyer) starts the auction for a lot (set G) of items by giving high value M for all possible bundles from the lot and decrease while auction is progressing. The value Pi can be interpreted as bidder i's m a . utility at the prices and ?r can be interpreted as 'min. amount, auctioneer has to pay for the set of items G.
Of course the auctioneer can not solve explicitly the value Pi since Vis are the private values of the bidders.
We can understand Pgk = P-r~ means auctioneer pjving discriminatory prices to aEents for getting bundle where
S. Ifihe prices are nondiscriminatory thin
we can formulate a new linear program, whose dual has non discriminatory prices. We call that as linear 
P ; + R s L M -K , ,
Vi,S At every round of the auction, the auctioneer has to solve the WD problem (finding tentative winners for minimizing n), which is an NP-hard problem. The size of the problem depends on the number of best response bids after decreasing price E on the bundles. By increasing the e value one can avoid more number of bids, but there is a loss in economy. The example given bellow discusses a simple reverseauction for two items A,B to be procured from three bidders <4!, A i , A i . The ask prices on possible bundles are Prk, PEk, Pi2. R, TA, C , U b are auction round, tentative allocation, Cost to be paid for the tentative allocation and number of unsuccessful bids respectively. In the example we choose E = 5 for all rounds of the auction. Instead of a fixed E , if we can reach the end of the auction in less number of rounds by choosing a variable e, which takes different values at different rounds with out loss of economy, then we can where B, is the number of best response bids at state I.
Let e be the decrement, the auctioneer will choose on all over demanded bundles for the next round bids.
That means the auctioneer chooses one of the possible controls from the set E= {€I, € 2 , . . .} If the probability structure is known, then we can solve the above stochastic dynamic programming by backward induction. When the probability structure is not known a priori, Reinforcement Learning in MDPs can be used to learn an optimal Markovian determine j and g ( i , U , j ) are generated from the pair (i,u) by simulation.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed an efficient auction mechanism for e-procurement, which we call IBPA (Iterative Bundle Procurement Auction). IBPA is based 
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